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Abstract This paper examines whether progress in transition has a significant
effect on the economic efficiency for 24 transition countries from 1990 to 2006. It
uses nine progress factors to analyze the role of the progress factors to explain
inefficiencies. It also questions the effect of the transition countries that recently
joined the European Union on efficiency. The results suggest that the average
efficiency scores for EU-N10 are much higher than the average efficiency scores for
SEE/CIS. The scores increase over time for both groups of transition countries.
Reforms also contribute to efficiency in general.
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JEL Classification P27  C1
Introduction
In the first half of the 1990s socioeconomic conditions and the transformation as well as
the starting points restrained transition countries economic structures in the transition
period. Transition countries renovating themselves from command economies towards
market driven economies experienced an initial large decline in production, a condition
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that all transition economies shared.1 Transition to a market economy required
significant restructuring processes, reallocation of labor between sectors. After the mid-
1990s market-oriented policy reforms have played a significant role in promoting
subsequent economic growth (Boeri and Terrel 2002; Kornai 2006). However, output
depicted a rapid growth mostly in the Baltic countries, while the growth rate was slower
in others. Farm restructuring and the liberalization of marketing institutions proceeded
more gradually in most of the Common Independent States (CIS) compared with the
Central and Southeastern Europe and the Baltic (CSB) countries.
Attempts to explain the performance of transition countries focused on and
supported the role of initial conditions and policies (De Melo et al. 1997; Falcetti
et al. 2002). Recent work has been more reluctant to explain the progress focusing
on the initial conditions. The focus shifted from calendar time to ‘‘transition time’’
and on the endogeneity of reforms, the role of government, etc. (Firdmuc 2003;
Lysenko 2002; Falcetti et al. 2005).
Pertaining the performance of the transition countries can be elucidated in how
effective policies have been implemented in two respects: how old enterprises have
been disciplined and how the new ones have been encouraged. Estonia, Hungary,
Poland for example succeeded in both and performed relatively better. Bulgaria, the
Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine succeeded in the latter,
yet failed in the first. Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are countries to the
case in point that failed in both (World Bank 2002).
In the transition period various and ranging factors have been acknowledged to be
main contributors to the success of transition economies. Establishing and maintain-
ing discipline, implementing reforms in labor and financial markets and social
protection system promoting the development and maintenance of human capital, as
well as generating an investment environment for the entry of SMEs, particularly, are
examples of effective policies in the transition process. Along with the effective
policies, institutional change is renowned to be an integral part, especially if the
political systems affect the incentives of politicians to follow certain reforms.
In this context, countries that went through the accession process and prepared to
be members of the European Union (EU) were better candidates, if not for all, for
most, when compared to the rest of the transition countries, in discipline, for
imposing hard budget constraints and trade liberalization and for enforcing
competition with necessary monitoring. The adoption of laws for property rights
that support the investment environment for both domestic and foreign investors is
another significant advance in reform for the accession countries. However, whether
such progress in transition enables a country to achieve more economic efficiency is
an issue that we aim to discuss in this study.
This study measures (in)efficiencies of 24 transition countries, eight of which are
the new members of the EU, by incorporating the effects of structural and
institutional progress. This analysis will not only help us to see the performance of
transition countries, but also analyze the efficiency differences across transition
1 Output decline was highest in Georgia (about 80 % decline) and very high in Armenia and Moldova,
whereas Poland had the mildest decline of about 6 %. The CEB/SEE average was about 23 %, and the
CIS average was about 50 %.
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countries and specify which reforms contribute to (in)efficiencies the most. We will
also discover whether the accession process to the EU, finalizing in membership,
has any significant effect on the implementation of reforms and (in)efficiencies.
The paper proceeds as follows. ‘‘Data and Empirical Application’’ describes the
data and the empirical application to measure efficiency scores along with
inefficiency factors. ‘‘Empirical Results’’ provides the results and discusses the role
of inefficiency factors on efficiency, in detail, accounting for the transition progress
time. ‘‘Final Remarks’’ concludes the paper.
Data and Empirical Application
The empirical analysis uses data on 24 countries, grouped under EU-N10 and SEE/
CIS, from 1990 to 2006. EU-N10 includes the countries that joined the EU as of
May 2004. SEE/CIS stands for other transition countries in Southeastern Europe
(SEE) and Common Independent States (CIS). The list of countries is presented in
Table 1 below. We analyze the countries in two groups to compare the technical
change, efficiency change and productivity growth. Table 1 shows that the average
annual growth rates of real GDP is much higher for CEE countries compared to the
SEE/CIS countries for the whole sample. However, two groups have approximately
equal average annual growth rates of real GDP after 1995, showing that economic
growth is promoted by market-oriented policy reforms, which started to show its
effect after 1995 for most of the transition countries.
We obtained the GDP figures in constant 2000 US dollars from the World
Development Indicators (WDI) and used it as the output data. Labor statistics and
capital stock figures are also obtained from the same source. Following Easterly and
Levine (2001), we used a perpetual inventory method to compute capital stocks.
Capital is represented as K(t) = k*GDP(t), where k, the capital-output ratio, was
computed as k = i/(g ? d), assuming that countries are at their steady state initially.
In this equation, i represents the ratio of investment [gross fixed capital formation in
constant 2000 US dollars, I(t)] to output, g is the average growth rate of real output,
and d is the depreciation rate, which is assumed to equal 0.07. After calculating the
initial capital stock, we calculate capital for the following years with the equation
K(t ? 1) = (1-d)K(t) ? I(t).
In addition, we use transition progress data published by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to analyze the effect of progress in
transition on the performance of the transition countries. EBRD offers four
categories that include nine factors to indicate structural and institutional progress;
enterprises including the index of small-scale privatization, large-scale privatiza-
tion, and enterprise reform; markets and trade, including the index of price
liberalization, foreign exchange system, and trade liberalization and competition
policy; financial sector, including the index of banking sector reform and the reform
of non-bank financial institutions; and the index of infrastructure reform.2
2 Cyprus and Malta did not provide transition progress data and, hence, were excluded from the analysis.
Serbia and Turkmenistan were also excluded from the analysis due to their scattered data. Therefore, we
continued our analysis with 24 countries, although we originally obtained data on 28 countries.
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To analyze the economic performance of transition countries, we consider the
stochastic frontier specification of a production function that allows the error to be
divided into an inefficiency component, which may represent random effects
beyond the control of the economy. This decomposition of the error term, developed
by Battese and Coelli (1992), allows for the simultaneous estimation of the
production function and the inefficiency function.3 In this study, we utilize the
translog specification, a flexible form of the production function:
ln Yit ¼ b0 þ b1 ln X1it þ b2 ln X2it þ
1
2
b3ðln X1itÞ2 þ
1
2
b4ðln X2itÞ2 þ b5 ln X1it ln X2it
þ eit
where i denotes the country; t denotes time; ln represents the natural logarithm; Yit
is gross domestic product at constant 2000 US dollars at time t and for country i; X1
Table 1 List of transition countries and their real GDP growth rates
New EU-10 Real GDP
growth (%)
1990–2006
Real GDP
growth (%)
1995–2006
SEE/CIS Real GDP
growth (%)
1990–2006
Real GDP
growth (%)
1995–2006
Cyprus 3.88 3.57 Albania 3.39 5.55
Czech Republic 1.79 2.96 Armenia 3.14 9.11
Estonia 3.05 7.35 Azerbaijan 3.77 12.56
Hungary 2.16 4.15 Belarus 2.43 7.22
Latvia 2.05 7.39 Bulgaria 1.05 2.66
Lithuania 1.15 6.18 Croatia 1.11 4.17
Malta 3.60 2.74 Georgia -1.71 6.89
Poland 3.77 4.43 Kazakhstan 1.82 6.85
Slovak Republic 2.30 4.52 Kyrgyz
Republic
-0.79 4.55
Slovenia 2.61 4.04 Macedonia,
FYR
0.14 2.30
Moldova -3.16 2.54
Romania 1.32 2.75
Russian
Federation
0.09 4.21
Serbia and
Montenegro
5.21 5.21
Tajikistan -1.88 5.10
Turkmenistan -2.04 4.82
Ukraine -1.93 3.32
Uzbekistan 2.10 4.88
Average annual
growth rate of
real GDP
2.64 4.73 0.78 5.26
3 For a review of the theory and application of stochastic frontier models, see Coelli et al. (2005) and
Kumbhakar and Knox Lovell (2003).
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is capital stock; X2 represents the labor force measured by the number of total
employees. The error term is defined as ei = Vi - Ui, where Vi is the noise com-
ponent and is independently and identically distributed with a N(0, rv
2). The non
negative Ui error term, with similar properties to the noise component, captures firm
specific technical inefficiencies and is independently and identically distributed with
N(Zid,ru
2). The mean of firm-specific technical inefficiency (Ui), li, following
Battese and Coelli (1995), is defined as the following:
li ¼ d0 þ
X10
j¼1
djZij
Zi, also called background variables, are vector of other factors that influence
production directly, which may represent inefficiency. We assign the level of
structural and institutional reforms as Z variables. EBRD provides a long sample
of indices to measure the level of reforms for transition countries. The neat part of
these indices is that they are all collected by the same source and are comparable
across countries, since the definition and interpretation of the indices are the same
for all countries.4 The indices, as indicated earlier, cover four main areas of reforms:
liberalization, stabilization, privatization, and structural reforms. An index score
ranges from 1 to 4.33, 1 indicating no reform and 4.33 corresponding to a well-
functioning market economy.5 We use these cardinal scores of reform indices
individually as inefficiency variables. Therefore, Z1 and Z2 represent the index of
small-and large-scale privatization, and Z3 represents the enterprise reform. Z4 is the
index of price liberalization; Z5 represents trade liberalization, mostly foreign
exchange system (forex); Z6 is the progress in the competition policy; and Z7 and Z8
represent the progress in banking sector reform and non-bank financial institutions,
respectively. Finally, Z9 represents the index of infrastructure reform. In addition,
we added one more Z variable to capture the differences between EU-N10 and other
transition countries, SEE/CIS, when calculating the efficiency scores. Thus, Z10 is a
dummy variable and is one if the country is a new member of the EU, namely
EU-N10, and zero otherwise.
Empirical Results
We estimate the parameters of the production frontier and predict individual
technical efficiencies by the maximum likelihood method using FRONTIER 4.1
software.6 The high gamma value (c = rv
2/r2), found to be 0.79, states that much of
the variation in the composite error term is due to the inefficiency component. In
addition, the null hypothesis Ho: bjk = 0 (i.e., the cross-product terms of inputs in
4 Note that the EBRD indicators are criticized based on their subjectivity and their ordinal nature as well
as its use of policy input and output measures (Falcetti et al. 2002, Campos and Horvath 2005). Yet,
another study by Rusinova (2007) uses both Campos and Horvath’s corrected data set and EBRD data set
and does not find any change in the main results.
5 See the appendix in Table 4 for the classification system for transition indicators.
6 See Coelli (1996).
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the translog frontier regression are zero) is strongly rejected. This statistic is based
on the likelihood ratio (k = -2{log[L(H0)]–log[L(H1)]}) that is equal to 774.1
(with -552.82 and -165.77 of the restricted Cobb-Douglas and translog models,
respectively), suggesting that the Cobb-Douglas specification is not adequate for our
data. The null hypothesis Ho: dj = 0 that specifies the absence of inefficiency
factors (all inefficiency coefficients but the intercept are zero) is also strongly
rejected, based on the likelihood ratio of 230.7 (i.e., the values for the restricted and
the unrestricted translog models are -165.77 and -50.40, respectively). The
elasticities of inputs in the frontier, evaluated at the sample means, are 0.57 for fixed
capital and 0.45 for labour, indicating that constant returns to scale are the
dominating feature of the sample.7 The results are presented in Table 2.
The estimated parameters of inefficiency show a number of interesting results,
including that some reform level variables are significant in their effects. Some
Table 2 Maximum likelihood estimates of the stochastic frontier function and technical inefficiency
model for economic production
Parameter Coeff. est. t-stat
Stochastic frontier
Constant b0 9.8814 3.51
ln(capital) b1 0.3739 2.20
ln(labor) b2 0.0054 0.02
ln2(capital) b3 0.0566 30.60
ln2(labor) b4 0.1275 4.54
ln(capital*labor) b5 -0.0680 -5.69
Technical inefficiencies
Constant d0 1.0401 8.03
Small-scale privatization d1 0.1359 2.30
Large-scale privatization d2 0.2451 3.55
Enterprise reform d3 -0.1321 -1.02
Price liberalization d4 -0.1274 -2.65
Forex and trade liberalization d5 -0.0408 -0.81
Competition policy d6 0.3698 4.34
Banking sector reform d7 -0.1111 -1.03
Reform of non-bank financial institutions d8 -0.2348 -2.62
Infrastructure reform d9 -0.3777 -4.00
Dummy for EU-N10 d10 -1.5383 -3.38
Variance parameters
r2 0.1303 8.28
c 0.7909 18.77
Ln(likelihood) -50.40
7 Labor at the linear level is insignificant, suggesting possible over employment for the sample. Wage
adjustments and quantity of labor moved in different directions when CEE and SEE/CIS were compared.
See Boeri and Terrel (2002) for a discussion of labor market adjustments in transition countries.
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reforms of liberalization and stabilization suggest negative effects on efficiency
(hence, positive estimates) and some show positive effects on efficiency (hence,
negative estimates). Small-scale privatization and large-scale privatization, as well
as competition policy appear to be significant and to affect the efficiency negatively.
On the other hand, price liberalization, reforms on non-bank financial institutions,
and infrastructure affect the economic efficiency positively. Enterprise reform,
foreign exchange and trade liberalization, and banking sector reform do not have
any affect on the economic efficiency.
The estimated parameter of the dummy variable for EU-N10 countries as an
inefficiency factor is significant and negative, suggesting that being a new member
of the EU has a significant positive effect on economic efficiency. Calculated
inefficiency scores show that efficiency scores are significantly low in the CIS, on
average, but this does not necessarily suggest that the growth rate of efficiency is
lower in these countries. Figure 1 indicates the efficiency differences between
EU-N10 and other transition countries.
The left side corresponds to the average efficiency scores for SEE/CIS from 1990
to 2006. For EU-N10, the average efficiency scores are represented on the right
vertical axis. As seen from the figure, the average efficiency scores for EU-N10 are
much higher than for SEE/CIS. However, they behave in the same direction. In
other words, efficiency scores increase over time for both samples, except for a
declining trend for EU-N10 from 1992 to 1998.8
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Fig. 1 Efficiency scores for EU-N10 and SEE/CIS
8 If we include the former members of the European Union, EU-15, in our frontier analysis, so that
EU-15 describes the frontier, then the average efficiency scores for EU-N10 and SEE/CIS are about 0.71
and 0.63, respectively.
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Inefficiency Factors
The first phase of transition started with privatization and liberalization. Liberal-
ization reforms required ceasing intervention in economic activity; thus, market
forces determined outcome. Privatization reforms required redistribution of the
assets away from the state. All these reforms required governing and restructuring
but were mostly generated by market incentives and, hence, were relatively
straightforward and simple to implement. The transition countries have largely
completed these reforms.
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Fig. 2 The behavior of the efficiency scores with the progress factors
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The next phase in the transition, which began at different times across transition
countries, required institutional design, fundamental changes in the behavior of the
state and society, and an authority to control the change, progress, and effectiveness.
Reforms such as in the financial sector (Z7, Z8), in competition policy (Z6), and in
the development of a market-oriented infrastructure (Z9) showed modest progress,
especially for CIS (other transition) countries. All these reforms studied in the next
phase of transition were expected to be completed in a relatively short time span and
required bigger challenges and a more constructive role for the state.
Figure 2 presents nine different graphs representing the relationship between
efficiency scores and individual reform (Z) scores. On the horizontal axis, we use Z
categories from the lowest to the highest values. On the vertical axis, we report the
average efficiency score that corresponds to each Z categories. Hence, in a way, we
can observe whether efficiency improves, as progress factors improve.
From the figures, we see a positive relationship between efficiency scores and
individual reform (Z) scores, suggesting that as reforms are implemented and
progressed, the efficiency increases. This result does not hold for one factor,
however: foreign exchange and trade liberalization (Z5). This factor does not
significantly affect the efficiency, according to the figures.
In order to understand the role of the reform indicators individually and through
transition time, as well as the effect of negotiating towards being a member of the
EU, we repeated our analysis of production efficiency with ten different translog
production functions. First, we included the EU-N10 dummy variable as the only
inefficiency factor in the function. We found that being an EU-N10 country
increases efficiency significantly. Then, in line with the transition progress steps, we
continued our analysis by adding one factor at a time, first with privatization
reforms, then with liberalization and financial reforms, and finally with infrastruc-
ture reform.9 The addition of each factor provided the same sign with significance,
generally, and each step supported the addition of the new factor to the efficiency
model, as it captured a variance in the efficiency, seen by the test statistics, k.
Table 3 provides a summary of our results.
Based on the likelihood ratio statistics, the restricted model imposing no
inefficiency effects (k = 165.77) is rejected, favoring all unrestricted models in
Table 3. In addition, comparing the models with the previous model, as the previous
model is the restricted one, the statistics show that all models except model 3 add
significance to the previous model. In other words, the absence of the new
inefficiency factor is strongly rejected with the next model, excluding the third.
The results suggest that small-and large-scale privatization do not affect
efficiency significantly in the first phase of transition and decrease efficiency (have
significant positive effects on inefficiency) in the following phase, regardless of the
effect of other reforms. Governance and enterprise restructuring reform, on the other
hand, increases efficiency significantly in the first phase of transition period, but it
loses its significance on efficiency with concomitant improvement in financial
institutions (banking reform and interest rate liberalization and progress in securities
9 We realize that all the transition countries follow the same transition path in general, but not strictly:
not necessarily in a strict order, as in the models we propose.
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markets and non-bank financial institutions). Similar results can be seen for foreign
exchange and trade liberalization.
Price liberalization, on the contrary, does not have a significant impact on
efficiency, initially; later, however, with the reforms in financial institutions, it
affects the efficiency positively. Competition policy has a significant negative effect
on efficiency, regardless of the next reforms. Financial institutions and infrastruc-
ture reforms have significant positive effects on efficiency.10
Final Remarks
We analyzed whether reforms in transition countries achieve a higher level of
economic efficiency and whether this level changes for the accession countries into
the EU. In this context, we measured (in)efficiencies of 24 transition countries, eight
of which are new members of the EU, by incorporating the effects of structural and
institutional progress. This analysis helped us to compare the efficiency scores of
transition countries across time, incorporating the reform elements. This way, we
can have an idea about the performance of transition countries with specification of
the reforms that contribute to (in)efficiencies the most.
We found that the average efficiency scores for EU-N10 are much higher than the
average efficiency scores for SEE/CIS. The scores increase over time for both
groups of transition countries. Reforms also contribute to efficiency in general.
When we analyze the factors of the progress as individual reforms, we find that
small-and large-scale privatization do not have significant effects initially, but that
Table 3 Summary statistics for the analysis of Z
Model Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7 Z8 Z9 Z10 log[L(H1)] k
b
1 -/S -95.94
2 -/S -/S -93.29 5.3
3 ?/. -/. -/S -93.08 0.42
4 ?/. ?/. -/S -/S -86.05 14.06
5 ?/. ?/. -/S -/S -/S -82.76 6.58
6 ?/S ?/S -/S -/. -/S ?/S -79.52 6.48
7 ?/S ?/. -/S -/. -/S ?/S -/S -76.33 6.38
8 ?/S ?/S -/. -/. -/. ?/S -/S -/S -67.15 18.36
9 ?/S ?/S -/. -/S -/. ?/S -/S -/S -/S -60.61 13.08
10 ?/S ?/S -/. -/S -/. ?/S -/. -/S -/S -/S -50.40 20.42
kb stands for the likelihood ratio used to compare the translog model with the previous model
S represents the high significance of incorporating inefficiency effects into the models
10 See Havrylyshyn et al. (1998), Stiglitz (1999), and Radulescu and Barlow (2002) for the relationship
between the reform factors and growth. Havrylyshyn et al. (1998) show that liberalization affects
performance more significantly than the quality of the institutional environment, which shows its impact
in the later stages of transition. Stiglitz (1999) stresses the positive role of privatization along with
governance on growth. Radulescu and Barlow (2002) find price liberalization to be the most important
factor on growth, followed by restructuring and large-scale privatization.
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the factors of foreign exchange and trade liberalization, and later reforms affected
the efficiency negatively. Large-scale privatization suffered from political struggles
with insiders in state-owned companies for most of these countries and had to be
kept on the policy agenda in the second phase of transition (EBRD 2002).
The effect of the competition policy reforms on the efficiency was found to be
negative and significant for each model. These reforms are almost complete for
most of the transition countries in the first phase of transition.
Another early reform for these countries was price liberalization, which was
found to affect the efficiency positively with the introduction of non-bank financial
institutions and infrastructure reforms. Two of the second phase reforms, reforms of
non-bank financial institutions and infrastructure, were also found to affect the
efficiency positively.
Interestingly, one reform of the first phase, enterprise reform—which completes
to considerable improvement in corporate governance and new investment at the
enterprise level—and two reforms of the second phase, foreign exchange and trade
liberalization and banking sector reform, do not have any significant effect on
efficiency.
Appendix
See Table 4
Table 4 Classification system for transition indicators
Large-scale privatisation
1 Little private ownership.
2 Comprehensive scheme almost ready for implementation; some sales completed.
3 More than 25 % of large-scale enterprise assets in private hands or in the process of being privatised
(with the process having reached a stage at which the state has effectively ceded its ownership
rights), but possibly with major unresolved issues regarding corporate governance.
4 More than 50 % of state-owned enterprise and farm assets in private ownership and significant
progress with corporate governance of these enterprises.
4? Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: more than 75 % of
enterprise assets in private ownership with effective corporate governance.
Small-scale privatisation
1 Little progress.
2 Substantial share privatised.
3 Comprehensive programme almost ready for implementation.
4 Complete privatisation of small companies with tradable ownership rights.
4? Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: no state ownership of small
enterprises; effective tradability of land.
Governance and enterprise restructuring
1 Soft budget constraints (lax credit and subsidy policies weakening financial discipline at the
enterprise level); few other reforms to promote corporate governance.
2 Moderately tight credit and subsidy policy, but weak enforcement of bankruptcy legislation and
little action taken to strengthen competition and corporate governance.
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Table 4 continued
3 Significant and sustained actions to harden budget constraints and to promote corporate governance
effectively (for example, privatisation combined with tight credit and subsidy policies and/or
enforcement of bankruptcy legislation).
4 Substantial improvement in corporate governance and significant new investment at the enterprise
level, including minority holdings by financial investors.
4? Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: effective corporate control
exercised through domestic financial institutions and markets, fostering market-driven restructuring.
Price liberalisation
1 Most prices formally controlled by the government.
2 Some lifting of price administration; state procurement at non-market prices for the majority of
product categories.
3 Significant progress on price liberalisation, but state procurement at non-market prices remains
substantial.
4 Comprehensive price liberalisation; state procurement at non-market prices largely phased out; only
a small number of administered prices remain.
4? Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: complete price liberalisation
with no price control outside housing, transport, and natural monopolies.
Trade and foreign exchange system
1 Widespread import and/or export controls or very limited legitimate access to foreign exchange.
2 Some liberalisation of import and/or export controls; almost full current account convertibility in
principle, but with a foreign exchange regime that is not fully transparent (possibly with multiple
exchange rates).
3 Removal of almost all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions; almost full
current account convertibility.
4 Removal of all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions (apart from
agriculture) and all significant export tariffs; insignificant direct involvement in exports and imports
by ministries and state-owned trading companies; no major non-uniformity of customs duties for
non-agricultural goods and services; full and current account convertibility.
4? Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: removal of most tariff
barriers; membership in WTO.
Competition policy
1 No competition legislation and institutions.
2 Competition policy legislation and institutions set up; some reduction of entry restrictions or
enforcement action on dominant firms.
3 Some enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a competitive
environment, including break-ups of dominant conglomerates; substantial reduction of entry
restrictions.
4 Significant enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a competitive
environment.
4? Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: effective enforcement of
competition policy; unrestricted entry to most markets.
Banking reform and interest rate liberalisation
1 Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier system.
2 Significant liberalisation of interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of directed credit or
interest rate ceilings.
3 Substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency and of a framework for prudential
supervision and regulation; full interest rate liberalisation with little preferential access to cheap
refinancing; significant lending to private enterprises and significant presence of private banks.
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